Not really. Peirce received formal training in chemistry at Harvard, and wrote some manuscripts and papers on the subject in 1860s. One of them, The Pairing of the Elements (Chemical News, 1869), published the same year as Mendeleev's celebrated work, even anticipated the periodic law, but in a way common to chemists of the time (Hinrich, Odling, de Chancourtois, Meyer, and Newlands). At the same time, contra Mendeleev, he supported the Prout’s hypothesis that elements were aggregates of a single "protyle" (the hydrogen atom), and attempted to test it experimentally.

Peirce's originality rather manifested in his using of the chemical background as a springboard for analysis of relational logic, diagrammatic reasoning and various classifications he was so fond of. What some characterize as Peirce's philosophical proto-structuralism is directly motivated by his analysis of chemical graphs, see Bellucci, Peirce’s Chemistry of Concepts. It was a major contribution to the philosophy of chemistry, and science generally, that conceptualized the hypothetico-deductive method, the use of abduction and the function of diagrams in science, and chemistry in particular, but not to chemistry itself.

Campbell's recent thesis, The chemistry of relations, has a chapter dedicated to Peirce's manuscripts and papers on chemistry proper, it is the first study of this kind:

"I examine Peirce’s research interest in developing a system for classifying and grouping the chemical elements according to atomic weight is common to nineteenth century chemistry. In this respect Peirce’s interest is again main-stream for the period.In fact, as has already been discussed in chapter one, Peirce’s interests were also shared by his tutor Josiah Cooke... The arrangement of the chemical elements that Peirce achieved is described by Nathan Houser (1982:xx) as going ‘far in Mendeleev’s direction, before Mendeleev’s announcement of the [periodic] law’ and before Mendeleev’s work ‘became known in Western Europe and America’. Here again Peirce’s chemical researches mirror the concerns of other researches in both North America and in Europe.

...Whilst not wishing to challenge Fisch’s view of Peirce as ‘most original and versatile intellect’, I have highlighted that as a chemist, Peirce operated within the boundaries of what Thomas Kuhn (1996) described as normal science. Where Peirce differed was in his ready willingness to engage with the metaphysical issues that many chemists, including his tutor Josiah Cooke, chose to ignore. During the 1860s most scholars agree that Peirce almost ‘outsources’ his metaphysics from Kant when forming his philosophical position. What I believe is an addition to this scholarship is my claim that Peirce’s Kantian metaphysics emerges in his chemistry.

Of significance is that in1869 Peirce, by employing inductive reasoning, argues for an orderly arrangement of the chemical elements. That same year Peirce publishes a series of three papers which includes a justification for inductive reasoning which denies J.S Mill’s defence in terms of the orderliness of nature. I would argue that Peirce does not deny the discoverability of regularities in the world; rather the insufficiency of such an appeal to order to justify inductive reasoning. As we have seen Peirce’s justification turns on the likelihood that in the longer term inquirers –such as chemists seeking a ordered system for the chemical elements –would be ‘fated’ on occasion to be successful in their inductions, inductive reasoning being, at least at this stage in Peirce’s philosophy,the only form of ‘synthetic reasoning’ inquirers possess.

Not really. Peirce received formal training in chemistry at Harvard, and wrote some manuscripts and papers on the subject in 1860s. One of them, The Pairing of the Elements (Chemical News, 1869), published the same year as Mendeleev's celebrated work, even anticipated the periodic law, but in a way common to chemists of the time (Hinrich, Odling, de Chancourtois, Meyer, and Newlands). At the same time, contra Mendeleev, he supported the Prout’s hypothesis that elements were aggregates of a single "protyle" (the hydrogen atom), and attempted to test it experimentally.

Peirce's originality rather manifested in his using of the chemical background as a springboard for analysis of relational logic, diagrammatic reasoning and various classifications he was so fond of. What some characterize as Peirce's philosophical proto-structuralism is directly motivated by his analysis of chemical graphs, see Bellucci, Peirce’s Chemistry of Concepts. It was a major contribution to the philosophy of chemistry, and science generally, that conceptualized the hypothetico-deductive method, the use of abduction and the function of diagrams in science, and chemistry in particular, but not to chemistry itself. The same goes for physics. Aside from methodology, he was one of the first to go against the grain of times (and Kant) to argue from physics for metaphysical indeterminism ("tychism"), but did not do much in physics itself.

Campbell's recent thesis, The chemistry of relations, has a chapter dedicated to Peirce's manuscripts and papers on chemistry proper, it is the first study of this kind:

"I examine Peirce’s research interest in developing a system for classifying and grouping the chemical elements according to atomic weight is common to nineteenth century chemistry. In this respect Peirce’s interest is again main-stream for the period.In fact, as has already been discussed in chapter one, Peirce’s interests were also shared by his tutor Josiah Cooke... The arrangement of the chemical elements that Peirce achieved is described by Nathan Houser (1982:xx) as going ‘far in Mendeleev’s direction, before Mendeleev’s announcement of the [periodic] law’ and before Mendeleev’s work ‘became known in Western Europe and America’. Here again Peirce’s chemical researches mirror the concerns of other researches in both North America and in Europe.

...Whilst not wishing to challenge Fisch’s view of Peirce as ‘most original and versatile intellect’, I have highlighted that as a chemist, Peirce operated within the boundaries of what Thomas Kuhn (1996) described as normal science. Where Peirce differed was in his ready willingness to engage with the metaphysical issues that many chemists, including his tutor Josiah Cooke, chose to ignore. During the 1860s most scholars agree that Peirce almost ‘outsources’ his metaphysics from Kant when forming his philosophical position. What I believe is an addition to this scholarship is my claim that Peirce’s Kantian metaphysics emerges in his chemistry.

Of significance is that in1869 Peirce, by employing inductive reasoning, argues for an orderly arrangement of the chemical elements. That same year Peirce publishes a series of three papers which includes a justification for inductive reasoning which denies J.S Mill’s defence in terms of the orderliness of nature. I would argue that Peirce does not deny the discoverability of regularities in the world; rather the insufficiency of such an appeal to order to justify inductive reasoning. As we have seen Peirce’s justification turns on the likelihood that in the longer term inquirers –such as chemists seeking a ordered system for the chemical elements –would be ‘fated’ on occasion to be successful in their inductions, inductive reasoning being, at least at this stage in Peirce’s philosophy,the only form of ‘synthetic reasoning’ inquirers possess.