Hasok Chang is pretty mainstream: former President and Vice President of the British Society for the History of Science. His article We Have Never Been Whiggish
(About Phlogiston) begins:
From a modern perspective,
Lavoisier’s theory is just as wrong as advanced versions of the phlogiston theory. Three of the central
pillars of Lavoisier’s system are clearly at odds with modern chemistry: the oxygen theory of acidity,
the caloric theory of heat (which also explained the three states of matter), and the theory of combustion
(especially with regard to the production of heat and light). On the other hand, if we examine Lavoisier’s
lasting contributions, we find that various phlogistonists anticipated or outdid Lavoisier ....
The real problem with the much-reviled traditional historiography of the Chemical Revolution (and of
much else) is not whiggism, but a crude triumphalism, which unreflectively continues to celebrate what
was once victorious in the past.
Section 2 of this paper is a detailed critique of Lavoisier's theories vs. the phlogiston theory.
Another good read is this post by Thony Christie, who blogs about the history of science. A sample:
It is very easy from our standpoint in the twenty-first century to pour scorn on the theory of phlogiston, which viewed whiggishly, that is in comparison to our current knowledge of chemistry, can in some of its aspect appear more than somewhat ridiculous. However viewed within the context of the situation in which it was born the phlogiston theory made a great deal of sense.
Similar arguments can be made about many discarded theories, prime among them the Ptolemaic theory. Most of these negative evaluations arise from what Michael Bycroft calls the fixed-evidence fallacy:
This fallacy is committed by many works of history that assess the reasonableness of past beliefs according to how closely those beliefs resemble our own.
My problem with this history is not that it assesses past scientists,
nor that it assesses past scientists by present-day standards. It is
that it is a bad way of assessing past scientists by our standards. It
is bad because the evidence for most theories has changed through the
past, and the reasonableness of those theories has changed
This is a mundane point that does not require any Kuhn-like shifts in
norms or standards or research-programs. After reading the weather
forecast last night it was reasonable for me to believe that it would
not rain today. Now, watching the looming storm clouds, that belief is
no longer reasonable. What has changed is not my norms or standards
but the state of the evidence.